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 The general tone of Polish media reporting is positive and emphatic about the benefits of fracking.
 The geopolitical dimension of fracking overrides the technological/scientific dimension.
 The implementation of fracking is constructed as a national priority.
 Opposition to fracking is constructed as counter-normative and “anti-Polish”.
 Representations impede open and constructive dialogue about energy policy.
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a b s t r a c t
In a context of resource scarcity and political instability, new energy sources and technologies are being
explored in many parts of the world and exploited in some. One of these new energy sources is shale gas
and one of the countries seeking to decrease its energy dependence and increase its energy security is
Poland which is largely dependent on gas and oil imports from Russia. This article presents the results of
a thematic content analysis of articles reporting on shale gas/fracking published in Gazeta Wyborcza and
Rzeczpospolita, two leading Polish newspapers, from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2012. Findings
suggest that in media reporting the geopolitical dimension of fracking overrides the technological/
scientific dimension and that representations are overwhelmingly positive. Positive representations are
bolstered through particular linguistic framings. It is argued that the Polish press has polarized the
debate on fracking in a particular (positive) direction, which has silenced an open and constructive
debate concerning energy policy in Poland and constructed criticism of fracking as counter-normative
and “un-Polish.” The potential socio-political and policy implications of these media representations are
discussed.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Energy security and independence have become important
geopolitical concerns in the modern world. Novel energy technol-
ogies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and geoengineering,
are being discussed partly as a means of ensuring CO2 reduction
(Nerlich and Jaspal, 2012, 2013), while at the same time there is also
a pressing geopolitical need to find novel sources of energy
especially within nation-states, rather than importing them from
others.
One novel source of fossil fuel explored in this context of
climate change, resource scarcity and security concerns is shale
gas, one of a number of unconventional natural gases trapped in
deep geological formations. Shale gas is extracted by induced
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, whereby high-pressure water
with additives is used to increase fissures in the shale rock layer
and thereby extract natural gas embedded within the layer (see
The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012).
Shale gas is a natural gas and is therefore often claimed to have a
lower carbon footprint compared to traditional fossil fuels
(Engelder, 2011). It is sometimes positioned as a bridging or
transitional energy source and is argued to contribute to climate
change mitigation. However, debates are emerging about the
threat posed by fracking to water resources (Finewood and
Stroup, 2012), about large-scale methane leakage (Slezak, 2012),
and also about fracking as a distraction from efforts to reduce
carbon emissions (Schrag, 2012).
Previous research into representations and perceptions of
fracking highlights the controversy surrounding the practice and
the socio-political barriers that have impeded its full implementa-
tion in some parts of the US and in Western Europe (Jaspal and
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Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal et al., 2014a,b). In this article we want to
extend this analysis to Poland, where fracking is being promoted
as a viable option for energy security and independence, in
contrast to emerging opposition to fracking in several other
European countries (Johnson, 2014; O’Hara, 2014). Unlike in other
European countries, fracking in Poland is entwined with geopo-
litics—it has been depicted as a game-changer because it is
regarded as a means of liberating Poland from dependence on
Russian energy. Therefore, Poland is an important cultural and
political context for considering how the debate on fracking is
developing in different countries. In the context of CCS, Mander
and Gough (2006, p. 6) have argued that “[t]he way in which the
media report any new technology can radically affect the success
of its implementation—how it is received by the public and other
stakeholders as well as decision-makers in government and
business”. In this article we explore how the Polish press has
represented fracking and the hopes, fears and expectations asso-
ciated with it.
1.1. Energy policy in Poland
Black and brown coal has historically played a significant role in
the Polish economy and in energy production. Black coal has been
exported since before World War II and that process was accelerated
during the communist era. However, due to the rapid growth in
domestic energy consumption, black coal reserves began to decline
rapidly. Despite this, in 2006 91% of Polish electric energy production
still consisted of brown and black coal. The construction of the first
Polish nuclear power station, based on Soviet technology, began in
the early 1980s, but was abandoned in the wake of public protests.
According to the 2011 Polish Ministry of Economy document,1
imported gas currently constitutes 13% of Poland’s energy demand,
of which 80% is imported from Russia.2 Over the last 20 years
attempts have been made to import gas from other sources (Norway,
Azerbaijan), but with limited success. In 2006 the Polish government
decided to construct the LNG-Terminal in Swinoujscie (North-West
Poland) with a view to reducing its reliance on Russian gas imports.
In order to further diversify its energy mix, in 2009 the Polish
government announced its plan for the construction of a new nuclear
plant (Chmielewski, 2013). However, neither of the two projects is
complete. Although Poland’s energy mix is diverse and the role of gas
in this mix is relatively small, Poland remains reluctantly reliant upon
Russia for most of its gas imports. Against the historical backdrop of
Soviet influence on Poland, the question of Russian gas remains a
point of geopolitical contention. Therefore, claims that Poland may
have the largest shale gas deposits in Europe induced, at least for a
while, a sense of optimism about ‘liberating’ Poland from Russian gas
imports and securing energy independence.3
1.2. Media debates about fracking
In Poland fracking is still an emerging and future-oriented
technology which is shaped mainly by hopes and expectations.
Since 2011, there have been media reports that Poland may have
Europe’s largest reserves of shale gas, which could significantly
boost the Polish economy, and that the shale gas “treasures”
located in Polish territory may “free Eastern Europe from the
stranglehold of Russian gas” and thereby safeguard Poland’s
energy independence (Evans-Pritchard, 2013). However, it is also
noteworthy that in its 2012 report on shale gas the Polish
Geological Institute provided only modest estimates of shale in
Poland.4
As fracking is already underway in the US, where it has largely
been represented as a success-story (Wolfgang, 2013), Polish
advocates of fracking often point to the US to justify its endorse-
ment of the technology. Although socio-political opposition to
fracking has not manifested itself on a scale comparable to that of
Western Europe, there have been reports that some Polish
villagers believe that shale gas exploration threatens their liveli-
hoods (Materka, 2012). Unlike other European contexts, such as
France, which have imposed moratoria on shale gas explorations
because of environmental, political and social concerns,5 Polish
leaders appear to be expediting shale gas exploration in the
country (Atkins, 2013; Johnson and Boersma, 2013).
Fracking has attracted increased media attention globally since
around 2010. Given that traditional media are still one of the main
sources of information flow between policy makers, industrialists and
public perceptions of salient issues (Boykoff, 2011), it is surprising that
media reporting on fracking has not attracted more empirical atten-
tion. Two recent articles outline the social representations of fracking
in the UK broadsheet press (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014) and in online
media (Jaspal et al., 2014b). Using thematic analysis, Jaspal and Nerlich
(2014) found that in a short space of time, as the socio-political debate
on fracking developed, UK media reporting was initially characterized
by a period of optimism and subsequently by scepticism. The period of
scepticism focused principally upon the constructed risks associated
with fracking, such as health and ecological risks. Notions of threat
and coping were central to the media debate on fracking. Similarly,
Jaspal et al. (2014b) study of representations of fracking on YouTube
found that widely-available video clips about fracking focused mainly
on environmental risks and economic benefits, but that they also
rendered salient issues of human health and well-being.
In this article, we examine the dynamics of the debate on fracking
in the Polish press in two major Polish newspaper outlets, namely
Rzeczpospolita, which is a centre-right and business-oriented broad-
sheet with regular law-related editions, and Gazeta Wyborcza, which
is a centre-left broadsheet and was originally the voice of the
Solidarity trade union (Ash, 2002). Rzeczpospolita is a privately
owned newspaper with moderately conservative and nationalistic
stance, although it does not overtly favour any particular political
party in Poland. Conversely, Gazeta Wyborcza is also privately owned
but has a social liberal political stance, although it does not overtly
support any particular political party. The two newspapers are
generally regarded as rivals and, thus, an analysis of both news-
papers’ coverage of fracking is likely to provide a holistic view of
representations of fracking.
During the communist era the press and all media outlets were
controlled by the government and were subject to state censor-
ship. However, since the fall of communism in 1989, the free press
market has developed rapidly and includes a range of privately
owned newspapers and magazines. The Polish constitution,
adopted in 1997, guarantees freedom of the press, prohibits any
preventive censorship and forbids any licensing requirements for
the press (as in the case of the radio and television). Accordingly to
Freedom House,6 the Polish press scores 25/100 on freedom of
expression (with 0 indicating highest level of freedom). There is
long-standing recognition amongst communication and media
researchers that the press media perform an important agenda-
1 Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, Energy Sector in Poland,
http://www.paiz.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=19610.
2 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, 2011 Review,
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Poland2011_web.
pdf.
3 http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/07/
shale-gas-poland.
4 http://www.pgi.gov.pl/en/mineral-resources-en/shale-gas/4744-shale-gas-es
timates.html.
5 http://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/.
6 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/poland#.
U7aEkq1dXho.
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setting and opinion-forming function (McCombs, 2005). Indeed,
for most society members, the press media constitute a key source
of societal information regarding complex science and technology
issues (Jaspa et al., 2014a).
1.3. Fracking and geopolitics
The Polish political sphere is dominated by two main political
parties, namely Civic Platform (PO—Platforma Obywatelska) and
Law and Justice (PIS—Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (Szczerbiak, 2013).
Both parties have their roots in the pre-1989 anti-communist
opposition movement, and seek to distance Poland from Russia,
economically and politically. Both parties gained their popularity in
the early 2000s, when the country was governed by the post-
communist Democratic Left Alliance. Civic Platform has been in
power since the parliamentary elections in 2007, and its candidate,
Bronisław Komorowski won the presidential elections in 2010,
succeeding Lech Kaczynski (Law and Justice) who died in 2010.
Law and Justice reiterates the need for energy independence from
Russia and is a strong supporter of fracking. Civic Platform was not
originally opposed to economic collaboration with Russia, although
this position has changed in view of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis. Overall,
the political landscape in Poland favours moves towards greater
energy independence (from Russia).
Poland has long attempted to disassociate itself from its Soviet
past and, more recently, from its economic dependence upon
Russia (Prizel, 1998). This is not dissimilar to the US where it has,
for instance, been argued that shale gas will enable the US to
overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest producer of crude oil,
which will in turn ‘liberate’ US foreign policy from dependency on
oil-rich Arab states (Spencer, 2013). Thus, shale gas can be, and has
been, employed as a rhetorical device for safeguarding the
distinctiveness of nation-states from their historical and political
foes and for accentuating their independence from political and
economic outgroups and, thus, their sense of self-efficacy. This is
likely to be an especially potent argument for fracking in an era of
austerity.
Here the concept of the ‘Significant Other’ is useful. In her
research into national identity, Triandafyllidou (2002) notes that
each national group develops its identity at least partially in
opposition to outgroups, especially those that have been repre-
sented and perceived by national ingroup members as being either
threatening or inspiring in some way. Such outgroups are referred
to as ‘Significant Others’ and essentially represent what the
ingroup is not. Significant Others “condition the ingroup, either
because they are a source of inspiration for it, an example to follow
for achieving national grandeur, or because they threaten (or are
perceived to threaten) its presumed ethnic or cultural purity and/
or its independence” (Triandafyllidou, 2002, p. 33). It is reasonable
to view Russia as Poland’s Significant Other. Accordingly, this
article examines Polish press reporting of fracking in the context
of geopolitics. We present results of a thematic content analysis of
articles reporting on shale gas/fracking published in two major
Polish broadsheets, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. We address
the following questions:
 How is shale gas/fracking represented in the Polish media?
 What are the main characteristics of the Polish debate on
shale gas?
 How does the debate resonate with geopolitical concerns?
2. Methods
Guided by our research questions, we looked for quantitative
and qualitative patterns of recurring themes within our corpus.
Thematic analysis has been described as “a method for identifying,
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun
and Clarke, 2006, p. 78). Here the method is employed principally
in order to examine how fracking is represented in the Polish press.
Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza are the two Polish broadsheets
with the highest circulation numbers. Searches using the key words
‘gaz łupkowy’ (shale gas), ‘szczelinowanie’ (fracking) and ‘łupki’ (shale)
were conducted using the newspapers’ respective search engines and
the Factiva database (a global information resource, providing full-text
access to top national and international newspapers). Preliminary
searches indicated that the shale gas first entered the media domain
in January 2010. We decided to focus on newspaper articles published
between 1st January 2010 and 31st December 2012 because, on the
basis of previous media studies of fracking (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014),
we believed that this time frame would provide sufficient textual
material for examining changes in media representation. After exclud-
ing irrelevant articles, we were left with a corpus of 467 articles
(see Table 1). As indicated in Table 1, most articles (69%) were
published in Rzeczpospolita. The rest of the articles were published
in Gazeta Wyborcza. The newspaper has local editions in 21 Polish
cities and discussed shale gas issues principally in the local news
section of the newspaper.
As indicated in Table 2, the articles were mostly published in
the economy section of the newspapers—72% (n¼338); in the local
news section—11% (n¼53); and in opinion pieces—6% (n¼28).
The Polish-speaking analyst studied the 467 articles in the
corpus in order to acquire a high level of familiarity with the
broader themes, which were subsequently discussed analytically
with the other members of the research team. All authors then
discussed initial observations that captured essential qualities,
units of meaning and apparent rhetorical techniques within the
corpora, focusing upon particular forms of language, categoriza-
tions and emerging patterns in the data. These initial codes were
collated into preliminary themes, which captured the essential
qualities of the articles examined. The preliminary themes were
then organized in terms of two superordinate themes, namely
(i) Geopolitics and National Politics, and (ii) Framing Hopes and
Fears, because they generally converged thematically around these
two areas. In the following section, we shall first discuss over-
arching issues such as the general evaluative tone adopted in the
articles. We then explore the geographical focus of the articles, the
main actors and the political relations between them. After this
Table 1
Number of fracking-related articles published between 01-01-2010 and 31-12-2012.
Newspaper 2010 2011 2012 Total
Gazeta Wyborcza 15 60 72 147
Rzeczpospolita 26 103 191 320
Total 41 163 263 467
Table 2
Sections of newspapers.
Section Number of articles
Economy 338
Local 53
Opinion 28
First page 15
News 11
Law 6
“Shale gas” 6
Science 2
Other (e.g. culture) 8
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type of scene-setting, we focus on the two superordinate themes
that emerged from the analysis.
3. Results
3.1. General tone
The dominant tone adopted by the articles was mainly positive
(61%), while neutral and negative tones characterized 23% and 15%
of articles, respectively. In 2012, there was a rise in negatively
framed articles (50 articles). However, in most articles, the
negative tone was used when discussing Polish national govern-
mental or EU policies on shale gas, rather than when discussing
fracking as a practice. This was particularly the case in 2012, when
the Polish government was criticized for its lack of progress in
implementing relevant shale gas legislation. Conversely, there
were few articles that were critical of fracking. Thus, in terms of
general tone, media reporting on fracking was largely positive, as
indicated by these extracts from the corpus:
Exploitation of shale gas is an incredible opportunity for Polish
economy.7
Just as Internet was a revolution in communication, shale gas
has already shaken the energy market in the whole world and
it may change its future.8
The language of opportunity and hope for the futurewas employed
in order to promote fracking. Unlike the UK press, which was
gradually characterized by scepticism in relation to fracking (Jaspal
and Nerlich, 2014), the Polish press presented positive social repre-
sentations of fracking (in 2012 and 2013) and active engagement
with the practice was encouraged, rather than discouraged. These
representations clearly have an action orientation—namely, to
encourage the implementation of fracking in Poland and to remove
any obstacles to its implementation.
The generally positive tone of fracking can be explained in
relation to the newspapers’ focus upon the potential benefits
related to shale gas exploitation (see Fig. 1).
Indeed, over 70% of the articles in our corpus focused on the
benefits of shale gas (including articles that discussed both
benefits and risks). Almost one-fifth of the articles discussed
neither risks nor benefits, but mostly discussed the financial or
legal aspects of fracking and shale gas explorations. These repre-
sentations of fracking were anchored to positive economic and
social developments in Poland (Moscovici, 1988) and, thus, raised
hopes regarding the technology. This reinforced the action orien-
tation of engagement. Potential risks, copiously discussed in the
UK press (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014), were largely attenuated in the
Polish press, side-lining potentially negative and psychologically
troubling issues.
3.2. Geopolitics and national politics
Most of the articles studied (69%) discussed the question of
shale gas and fracking in the Polish national context—they focused
on Poland rather than discussing fracking in the US for example
(see Fig. 2). These 324 articles reported on the possibility of
implementing fracking in Poland and covered various issues, e.g.
shale gas exploration, government strategies, critiques of the
government or European policy, environmental issues, legislation,
and the regulation of activities by (foreign) gas companies in
Poland. Poland was sometimes positioned in the context of the
ongoing global debate around shale gas, as well as the geopolitical
consequences of further development of this energy source. Like
the UK media, the Polish media also constructed the nation as
possessing much potential in the domain of fracking and accen-
tuated the role of Poland in becoming a leader in shale gas. This
accentuation of national potential has been observed in the
media’s coverage of other climate change mitigation technologies,
such as CCS (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2013).
In addition, 49 articles discussed fracking in the context of other
countries—most often the US (18 articles) and Russia (12 articles).
There were discernible differences in the ways in which fracking in
these national contexts was depicted. The US was represented as a
success-story and as an example that Poland should follow:
Cheap shale gas stimulated the American economy and the
exploitation of oil from shale has facilitated reduced expendi-
ture on fuel imports, despite the fact that oil is more expensive
than before the crisis.9
In the UK media, the US was similarly invoked as an example of
how Britain might fare in the domain of fracking (Jaspal and
Nerlich, 2014). However, the UK press also invoked fracking in the
US to substantiate risk representations. By contrast, in the Polish
media, invocations of fracking in the US were invariably positive.
Russia was portrayed as hostile country opposed to the exploita-
tion of shale gas in European countries. Consistent with the notion
Fig. 1. Benefits vs. risks of shale gas and fracking.
Fig. 2. Geographical focus of articles.
7 Gazeta Wyborcza, 20th November 2012.
8 Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 June 2010. 9 Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 November 2012.
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of the Significant Other, Russia was represented as a malevolent and
threatening outgroup opposed to Polish economic wellbeing and
prosperity:
So, who is the main enemy of the shale-gas Eldorado? Of
course it is Russia, which managed to make many European
countries dependent on their gas exports.10
Poland imports about 70% of its gas from Russia and in the
current crisis surrounding Ukraine (March 2014) it is seeking to put
into effect legislation for shale gas exploration.11 Just as the Polish
press rebuked political inaction, it condemned the alleged attempts
of the Russian outgroup, framed as ecologically driven, to curb
Poland’s economic and social development in the context of fracking:
Under ecology slogans, the pro-Russian lobby is making effort
to block shale gas extraction. They are quite effective.12
Nine other countries (UK, France, Germany, Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, and China) were also discussed
in the context of shale gas, highlighting the ban on fracking in
France and the more positive attitude to shale gas adopted by the
British government. The Polish media’s invocation of the ban on
fracking in France was different from that of the British press—it
constructed the French ban as an unfortunate development, rather
than as evidencing the risks associated with fracking. This was
generally represented as a mistake not to be repeated by Poland.
The political importance of fracking was clearly illustrated by
the fact that politicians and government officials were active in the
debate around shale gas. The Minister of Economic Affairs, parlia-
ment members and European Parliament members themselves
authored various articles, in which they emphasized their support
for shale gas, highlighted its importance for the Polish economy
and indicated their own active involvement in that process—at
local, national and international levels. This was especially obser-
vable in articles published in 2011, in which questions of safety and
risk in the context of fracking were discussed at the European
level. Regardless of political affiliation, most Polish politicians
expressed support for fracking. Almost unanimous cross-party
political support for fracking, clearly manifested in the media,
was pivotal in engendering a hegemonic social representation of
fracking as a positive economic and social development in Poland.
By ‘hegemonic’ we mean a uniform, coercive and consensually
shared representation of fracking (Moscovici, 1988).
There were two exceptions to this emerging hegemonic social
representation. First, representatives of a left-wing party Ruch Palikota
expressed (mostly in 2012) their support for anti-fracking activists.
However, when questioned by journalists, the party representatives
argued that they were not against shale gas/fracking, but rather
critical of the ways in which the government and gas companies had
dealt with local communities. One of the party members, Robert
Biedron stated that:
The Civic Platform [Party] is misleading people, suggesting that
we will become another Kuwait. Ruch Palikota does not oppose
the exploitation of shale gas. However, it is a huge problem in
my constituency. Gas companies don’t respect the law, they are
violating land ownership.13
Although there was a call for greater engagement with local
communities in order to safeguard their wellbeing during shale
gas exploration, statements from this political party were not
necessarily critical of fracking. However, the political opposition
did appear to question implicitly the extent to which shale gas
would be beneficial to the Polish economy (by problematizing the
“Poland is the New Kuwait” metaphor), on the one hand, and the
potential risks underlying the practice, on the other. Such criti-
cisms had not yet been levelled against the technology and were,
therefore, noteworthy. The criticisms could be viewed as contri-
buting to the emergence of a polemic, counter-representation to the
positive hegemonic representation of fracking.
Furthermore, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, an independent left-
wing senator and former prime minister indicated, in October
2012, that the government and gas-companies had overestimated
the amount of Polish shale gas deposits and that there should be a
debate on the scale of Polish investment in the technology. Again,
this constituted an attack against the government, rather than the
practice of fracking. This constructed fracking as a political, rather
than environmental, problem. Both of these dissenting voices
subtly challenged the emerging hegemonic representation by
calling for debate around the benefits and risks of fracking.
However, these risks were in no way comparable to those invoked
in the UK media—these constructed risks in the Polish media
concerned community and regulation.
Foreign politicians were also mentioned in the Polish press—
especially Obama and Putin. Obama’s visit to Poland in May 2011
was frequently referenced in the context of possible US-Polish
shale gas collaborations and US investment in Poland. Conversely,
Putin was constructed as an enemy of Polish shale gas explora-
tion.14 Geopolitical aspects of fracking came into focus with
references to Obama, largely as a role model to be followed, and
Putin as a threat to national wellbeing. As a personification of US
success in the domain of fracking, Obama was represented in
positive terms with Poland positioned alongside the US, while
Putin, as a personification of Russia’s obstruction of Polish eco-
nomic progress, was represented negatively as the outgroup.
Moreover, there was discussion of the actual and potential con-
sequences of fracking for global politics and international rela-
tions, such as the ‘imminent’ decline of Middle Eastern hegemony
in the energy sector, as has been the case for US media coverage of
fracking (Maugeri, 2013).
Other foreign politicians active in this debate were members of
the European Parliament. Articles frequently made reference to
European institutions (Parliament, Commission), especially after
summer 2011, when the question of safety and risks related to
fracking entered the European debate. European institutions were
often criticized and described as a threat to Poland’s interests by
Polish media and politicians, including those that usually
expressed support for the EU, e.g. Gazeta Wyborcza. This clearly
demonstrated the geopolitical traction of fracking, and its ability to
re-configure the Polish stance on the EU when this organization
was not perceived as supporting the Polish aspiration of fracking.
EU membership, and affinity to the EU agenda, appeared to
decrease in importance in the geopolitical context of fracking—a
national agenda.
Like the UKmedia debate on CCS (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2013), there
was a discernible shift and interchange between various geographi-
cal levels—international, national and regional. Although national
NGOs were not very active in the Polish press debate, those who did
manifest views on fracking were Polish organizations which were
supportive of shale gas exploitation. They criticized the Polish
government for its insufficient support for gas companies, its
inadequate legislation, and its lack of a coherent shale gas strategy.
Like the EU institutions, perceived as an impediment to fracking in
10 Rzeczpospolita, 10 September 2012.
11 http://www.canadianmanufacturing.com/energy/oil-and-gas/
poland-looks-to-reduce-dependence-on-russia-with-shale-gas-law-135422.
12 Rzeczpospolita, 6 June 2012.
13 Rzeczpospolita, 25th August 2012.
14 “Putin pushes Gazprom against shale gas”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25th
October 2012.
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Poland, the Polish government itself was sometimes susceptible to
intense criticism in media reporting when it was regarded as lacking
the willpower to implement fracking. Consistent with the positive
stance on fracking, media reporting tended not to acknowledge
social representations associated with anti-fracking activists or
environmentalists (e.g. representatives of Greenpeace Poland). This
was markedly different from the UK press which provided a more
balanced snapshot of the political debate on fracking, providing
voice to both supporters and opponents of fracking (Jaspal and
Nerlich, 2014).
Politicians emphasized the potential benefits of shale gas
exploration for both the national economy and local communities,
thereby constructing it as a national agenda and as a bringer of
national prosperity. There was discussion of fracking in the context
of national politics—in 37 articles (14%). For instance, the issue of
fracking was deployed as a rhetorical instrument for undermining
and delegitimizing an opposition party, as demonstrated by this
article reporting on the presidential campaign of 2010:
PIS [Kaczynski’s party] will attack Bronisław Komorowski—
during the campaign the candidate of PO [Komorowski’s party]
has shown his ignorance regarding shale gas. He thought that it
is exploited in open-pit mines.15
Here, fracking was constructed as a technology that national
politicians should be aware of and, accordingly, a candidate of PO
was ridiculed because of his alleged ignorance surrounding the
technology. This served to represent fracking as being central to
the national and political ethos of contemporary Poland. Fracking
was depicted as an emerging ingroup norm, that is, a central
aspect of contemporary Polish national identity and, thus, opposi-
tion to this norm results in ostracisation. Opponents were posi-
tioned as ingroup ‘Black Sheep’ (Marques et al., 1988).
Community representatives appeared in 22 articles. Most were
supporters of shale gas who highlighted their hope that fracking
would be implemented so that the local communities could reap
the benefits of shale gas. The benefits that community represen-
tatives referred to focused on the economic and employment
opportunities associated with fracking. Moreover, while the UK
media has highlighted tensions between the national and local
levels in the context of fracking, the Polish press represented a
positive synthesis between the gas companies interested in shale
gas exploration (that is, national energy policy) and the local
communities who were constructed as eagerly awaiting the imple-
mentation of fracking (given the alleged benefits that it would bring
to their communities).
Anti-fracking NGOs were only acknowledged in a minority of
articles. Most articles contested anti-fracking NGOs’ representations
by referring to such NGOs as ‘lacking knowledge’ of fracking, thereby
de-authorizing them from taking a (negative) stance on the technol-
ogy. This served to perpetuate the hegemonic positive representation
of fracking. For instance, the headline of one article referred to
“Peasants against shale gas”,16 which served to de-authorize anti-
fracking actors from making credible statements regarding fracking
because of their ‘peasant’ status. Emphasis of this category, rather
than their NGO status, served to highlight their lack of knowledge
and, thus, credibility vis-à-vis other ‘more knowledgeable’ actors
such as scientists and politicians. Indeed, it has been observed that
individuals, groups and institutions may contest social representa-
tions that they disagree with by challenging the legitimacy of the
disseminators of such representations (Breakwell, 1986). The delegi-
timization strategy (Bar-Tal, 2000) was similarly deployed in articles
which represented anti-fracking NGOs as having ‘private interests’
(e.g. they own summer houses in an area where shale exploration
may take place), as this too depicted anti-fracking NGOs as being
partial, selfish and working in their own, rather than in the national,
interest. Thus, anti-fracking NGOs were constructed as lacking
objectivity. Furthermore, anti-fracking activists were often anchored
to the threatening Russian outgroup, spearheaded by Putin, who
were depicted as seeking to halt fracking in Poland and, thus, to
curtail Polish energy independence.
A similar dynamic was at work when articles discussed topics
around policy, regulation and legislation in the context of risk.
Interestingly, the focus was generally on the risks that Poland
might face if it did not engage in fracking, rather than the potential
risks of the practice itself. Discussions of environmental and health
risks were not absent from the media, and there were reports that
such risks were highlighted by some anti-fracking groups in
Poland. However, as highlighted earlier, the social representations
of anti-fracking activists were frequently contested and dismissed.
Various experts (mostly scientists, but also engineers working for
gas companies) questioned the credibility of anti-fracking activists.
There was a competition of stakeholders in these articles, whereby
scientists and engineers were depicted as knowledgeable and the
anti-fracking NGOs as ignorant, obstructionist and even threaten-
ing (due to their anchoring to the Russian outgroup). While the
anti-fracking activists indicated that the risks associated with
fracking called for a review of existing regulation and legislation
vis-à-vis fracking, the supporters of fracking insisted that the
existing regulation and legislation were sufficient. The latter social
representation was attributed more credibility and prominence in
most articles.
3.3. Framings hopes and fears
The Polish press manifested pride in Polish shale deposits, its
desire for Poland to use them to achieve energy independence,
and viewed fracking almost as a national duty—not dissimilar to
recent pronouncements by David Cameron in the UK.17 As high-
lighted earlier, the Polish press coverage adopted a positive tone
and focused on hopes rather than fears. In order to understand the
growing socio-political traction of fracking, we decided to examine
how these hopes and fears were expressed linguistically.
Those articles that focused on hopes and benefits of fracking
constructed it almost as a universal panacea for Poland and
indicated that “Shale gas will solve Polish problems.” The most
important linguistic framing in this context was that of the ‘Great
Chance,’ a chance that, by implication should not be lost or missed.
Consistent with the theme of geopolitics and national priorities,
this framing highlighted the benefits of fracking but also stressed
that the opportunity would expire if not seized instantly. In
articles that employed this frame, the future of ‘Shale gas Poland’
was described as a ‘Shale Gas Eldorado’. This hope of a golden
future was also expressed through the use of metaphors and
comparisons such as: ‘At heaven’s door’; ‘The Golden Age of Shale
Gas’; ‘Pomerania is like Qatar’ ‘Poland is the new Kuwait’. The
following quotes exemplify this type of framing focusing on shale
gas a great chance for Poland:
There is a real chance to generate substantial income for the
state and companies, for many new job places, for a political
independence and a real change of our geopolitical situation.
This is probably the biggest economic and political chance in the
last twenty years—after the accession to the EU and NATO.18
15 Gazeta Wyborcza, 25th June 2010.
16 Gazeta Wyborcza, 8th October 2011.
17 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/fracking/10723294/David-Camer
on-Britain-has-a-duty-to-frack.html.
18 Rzeczpospolita, 23rd March 2012.
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[W]e have a reasonable chance of becoming an important shale
gas producer. It is also a chance for developments in other
branches of this industry. It means that shale gas can be a
source of income for local authorities and new jobs can be
created. It is also a chance for universities.19
Fracking was consistently constructed superlatively as ‘the
chance.’ which highlighted the unprecedented opportunities it
could provide for job creation, educational policies and other key
national concerns. A number of other positive frames reinforced
this representation of hope, i.e. ‘Things are happening,’ ‘Shale gas
revolution’ or ‘Together for shale gas’. These frames and the
‘Things are happening’ frame constructed optimism about the
future. Journalists stressed that shale gas ‘is here’, companies are
searching for companies ‘right now’ and potential benefits are
almost here, e.g.: “Shale gas may be available on Polish market as
soon as the turn of 2014 and 2015.”20; “We have shales!”,21 “It’s
time to begin the Great Drilling”.22 This constructed a sense of
imminence in the implementation and, crucially, success of frack-
ing in Poland, and also reflected the type of language that has been
used in the context of biotechnology, which mobilizes the future
into the present, thereby attempting to create a better future
(Brown, 2003).
Articles in the corpus indicated that, in order to achieve this
future now, there was a need for national unity. The ‘Together for
shale gas’ frame encourages Polish politicians, business, local
communities or scientists to unite in their ‘fight’ for Polish shale
gas. This was expressed in newspaper headlines such as: ‘Polish
giants are going together for shales,’ ‘Shale gas across the political
divisions,’ ‘A shale alliance in Pomerania’. This was also observable
in an editorial published in Rzeczpospolita in March 2012, in which
the journalist stated:
There is a very difficult task confronting our political class. This
is not a clean business. This is great business and great politics.
It will be decisive for Poland’s future economic and geopolitical
issues. Therefore we should appeal to the politicians from both
sides [of the political scene] not to turn shale gas into an issue
to fight over. This is a matter for the entire nation—a great
chance for Poland, for which we should suspend our fights.23
The fight referred to in this extract functioned at various levels,
most notably in opposing the anti-fracking factions both at the
national and EU levels. The EU, as a perceived opponent to Polish
shale gas, was mostly constructed as posing a potential threat to
the national vision for the future. Many articles (especially in 2011)
covering proposed European regulations of fracking were framed
using the ‘Threat to our shale gas’ frame. The use of this frame
increased each year, which could be attributed to both the ongoing
debate in Europe and emerging scepticism regarding fracking in
Poland. The ‘threat’ frame was directly linked to the ‘unite in the
fight for shale gas’ frame.
The perceived sources of this threat to Polish shale gas were
European institutions, environmentalists, various lobbying groups
and most of all Russia (i.e. Russian government and Gazprom).
Simultaneously, articles highlighted two main supporters of shale
gas exploitation (at the international level), namely multinational
gas companies and the US. One journalist called this the ‘Great
Game’ around shale gas (‘Ukraine plays shale-poker’; ‘The gas-
game’; ‘The most important Polish game’; ‘It’s just the beginning
on our way for the gas wealth’). The use of ‘Great Game’ metaphor
was consistent across the time-period studied, although it was
more popular in 2011. This clearly referred to a game Poland
wanted to win, not only in order to gain energy independence but,
more generally, (economic) freedom from both Russia and Europe.
In the context of this frame, and the US–Russia distinction, the
‘Agent of freedom’ frame (‘The dawn of energy freedom’; ‘The end
of the spheres of influence’) is noteworthy. Shale gas was often
framed as an ‘agent of freedom’ that would allow Poland to gain
energy independence from Russia. By contrast, anti-fracking
entities were seen as opposing such freedom and, thus, as a threat.
Discussions around the possible environmental consequences
of fracking, European regulations, news of gas companies with-
drawing from further investments in Polish shale gas, as well as
slow pace of implementing Polish regulations of the shale gas
market, resulted in the growing use of negative frames, such as the
‘We may lose it’ frame (e.g. the headline ‘Big gas-defeat’). There
was a shift from a representation of hope linked to a representa-
tion of threat (namely, if we do not exploit shale gas fast we will
miss out on a better future) to a representation of caution and
even despair (namely, we may not be able to exploit shale gas as
fast as we thought and we actually may miss out on a better
future). This highlighted the urgency of implementing fracking
before it is too late.
4. Discussion
Findings show that media reporting of the technology was
overwhelmingly positive. The emerging positive representation
was uniform, coercive and consensually shared in that there were
few differences in the representational tendencies of the two
largest Polish broadsheets studied, despite their ideological differ-
ences. Accordingly, it is possible to talk of a hegemonic positive
social representation of fracking in the Polish press.
4.1. Maintaining the positive social representation of fracking
The press coverage was characterized primarily by references to
the economic, national and social benefits that fracking would bring
to Poland. Most of the actors (politicians, business people, scientists,
journalists) expressed their support for the technology. Poland was
portrayed as having rich deposits of shale gas and, thus, fracking as
an unquestionable success-story waiting to happen. There appeared
to be a certain naiveté regarding the process of generating shale gas,
as well as the potential risks associated with fracking which were
very rarely acknowledged. Rather, there was a euphoric celebration
of Poland’s national self-efficacy due to its alleged shale reserves and
one of the key purported benefits was for Polish economic security
and independence.
When the potential risks were (peripherally) outlined in articles,
they were frequently qualified by information to suggest that the
benefits vastly outweighed the costs and that the practice of fracking
should, therefore, be implemented. Similarly, in the UK media
coverage of CCS (Nerlich and Jaspal, 2013), the technology itself
was rarely discussed, especially not its three technical components:
carbon, transportation and storage. The economic, political and
social aspects of implementing CCS constituted the focus of media
coverage, which obscured the potential technological difficulties.
Likewise, the Polish media debate on fracking is characterized
principally by economic and political concerns. There is little
discussion of the scientific, technological and practical aspects of
fracking. By focusing on these aspects of the fracking, rather than
technological aspects which could be contested, the press is able to
construct and maintain a positive representation of the practice.
Crucially, the pervasiveness and coerciveness of this representation
in the media may mean that it will be unanimously and uncritically
19 Gazeta Wyborcza, 12th December 2012.
20 Rzeczpospolita, 9th September 2011.
21 Gazeta Wyborcza, 7th August 2011.
22 Rzeczpospolita 15th June 2010.
23 Rzeczpospolita, 12th March 2012.
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accepted by the Polish public. Indeed, a survey carried out by the
Public Opinion Research Center, CBOS in September 2011 indicat-
ed that 73% of Polish respondents were in favour of shale gas
exploration in Poland, despite the potential risks associated with
fracking, with only 4% of respondents opposed to it (Rutkowski,
2013).
The hegemony of the positive social representation of ‘Polish
shale’ appears already to have rendered any critical discussion of
fracking increasingly difficult—those participating in the debate
are unable to question the feasibility of fracking in Poland and to
do so amounts almost to an act of ‘national treason’ given its
constructed centrality to the Polish national ethos. Indeed, groups
and institutions raising concerns about fracking were habitually
positioned as either deliberately obstructionist or ignorant and,
thus, in no position to criticize fracking. This was made possible by
constructing fracking as a quintessentially national concern given
its alleged benefits for the future and wellbeing of the Polish
nation (Prizel, 1998). Anti-fracking activists and entities (both
Polish and foreign) were, accordingly, represented as jeopardizing
this aspect of ingroup identity. The conflation of Polish anti-
fracking activists with the threatening Russian outgroup consti-
tuted a powerful means of silencing dissent, as it positioned
ingroup members alongside ‘them’ and, thus, in opposition to ‘us’.
Attempts to question positive representations of fracking were
met with condemnation. There was only one Polish political party
Ruch Janusza Palikotawhich subtly expressed doubts about fracking in
Poland. However, this stance was criticized by the political opposition
and by the press. Consequently, politicians from Ruch Janusza Palikota
issued several statements denying that they had contested fracking
per se and that their position had been ‘misunderstood’ by the media.
They reiterated their support for fracking, while condemning the
government’s handling of shale gas exploration. Thus, the critique of
fracking appeared to be ‘off-limits’ given its growing centrality to the
Polish national ethos and could, therefore, be used almost as a
rhetorical weapon for delegitimizing political opponents. The only
discernible critique in our corpus focused not on the principle of
exploiting Polish shale gas, but rather on some legal and bureaucratic
aspects of this process. Although the social representation that
fracking poses potential risks to the environment was occasionally
acknowledged, it was often contested by journalists who claimed that
protesters were in fact only worried about the natural environment
when it affected their own assets or interests. This served to
delegitimize those voicing such concerns because it constructed them
as acting out of personal gain, rather than in the nation’s interest.
Anti-fracking activities in Poland and abroad met with strong
opposition. The press usually questioned the credibility, knowl-
edge or trustworthiness of anti-fracking activists. Some articles in
our corpus suggested that anti-fracking activists were colluding
with threatening outgroups, such as the Russians, which served to
minimize their credibility. This implicitly constructed anti-fracking
activists as ingroup ‘Black Sheep’ (Marques et al., 1988) who were
disloyal to the Polish national ingroup. Shale gas was consistently
described as a historic opportunity for positive change and that it
will provide both economic and political independence (from
Russia). Therefore any individual or organization questioning
fracking was automatically positioned as threatening Poland’s
development and, thus, implicitly as an ‘enemy.’
This study demonstrates that multiple actors were generally
united in their defense of fracking. In the early media coverage,
the unity of these actors in the context of fracking was principally
economic and organizational in nature. Groups and organizations
collaborated to accelerate shale gas exploration in Poland and to
convince people of its long-term advantages. However, during the
later stage of the debate a new form of unity emerged in the media—
these actors united in their opposition to the emerging anti-fracking
lobby. Although none of the anti-fracking lobby’s arguments were
accorded any credibility, the lobby itself was acknowledged and
positioned as a threat within. There was a desire to protect Poland’s
shale gas program, and politicians were often constructed as safe-
guarding Poland’s interests by supporting fracking. Poland’s interests
were most notably protected at an international, geopolitical level.
4.2. Positioning Polish shale gas in geopolitical contexts
Our analysis demonstrates that geopolitics and intergroup
relations clearly play a prominent role in media reporting on
fracking. Social psychology provides useful insights into the inter-
relations between Polish media reporting on fracking and geopo-
litics. This interaction and interplay with Significant Others, which
in social psychology are defined as outgroups that are viewed as
being either threatening or inspiring in some way, was clearly
observable in media reporting on fracking. The US and Russia
appeared to be constructed as Poland’s Significant Others. The US
was consistently represented as a positive actor and Poland was,
accordingly, positioned alongside the US in the context of fracking.
President Obama, as a personification of the US, was represented
positively as a supporter of Polish energy and economic aspira-
tions and, thus, as an ‘inspiring’ outgroup to be followed. In short,
for Poland to realize its full economic potential, it would need to
follow the US in implementing fracking.
Conversely, Russia was consistently positioned as a political
and economic outgroup and as a malevolent actor attempting to
impede, rather than facilitate, Poland’s engagement with fracking.
As a major gas exporter, Russia was constructed as a natural
enemy of Polish shale gas, which itself was represented as a
central aspect of Poland’s national ethos. Thus, the Russian out-
group was constructed as posing a threat to Poland’s economic
and social wellbeing. Given that some internal opponents of
fracking were conflated with the Russian outgroup, they too were
delegitimized as ‘foreign agents’ whose principal aim was to serve
Russian, rather than Polish, interests. For instance, some actors
suggested that the reason for ExxonMobil’s decision to withdraw
from further shale gas exploration in Poland was its collaboration
with (and, thus, implicit influence from) Russian gas companies.
Thus, Russia was consistently represented as posing a negative
challenge to Poland’s aspirations and challenged the nation’s
independence.
The Polish media debate on fracking also demonstrated the
changing intergroup dynamics between Poland and the EU (Cordell,
2000). It was interesting to observe that Gazeta Wyborcza, which
traditionally espouses a traditionally pro-EU stance, overtly criti-
cized EU policy in the context of shale gas. Moreover, France, as a
fellow EU member, was rebuked for its ban of fracking, which was
regarded as being both shortsighted and reactionary. As a perceived
opponent of Polish shale gas, the EU was widely described as posing
a threat to Poland’s economic plans and, thus, there was an
observable conflation of Russia and the EU as an economic threat.
Given the centrality of fracking to the Polish national agenda and
the constructed national ‘duty’ of supporting it, it is possible that
this will ultimately re-shape intergroup relations with EU if the
organization is perceived as an impediment to Poland’s realization
of its hopes regarding fracking. The debate on fracking has already
marked a significant change in representational tendencies vis-à-vis
the EU—originally, the EU was represented as a supporter of
democracy and of Polish economic and social development, but in
our corpus it was increasingly represented as an irresponsible
organisation under excessive influence from anti-fracking lobbies.
In addition to the environmental and social aspects of fracking, it is
clearly important for researchers to monitor its geopolitical aspects
and consequences given the vast shifts in media representations of
the various institutions, outgroups and Significant Others associated
with the Polish state.
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5. Conclusions and implications
Our analysis shows that fracking has become a prominent topic
in the Polish press, compared, for instance, to the media debates
on biotechnology, nanotechnology or nuclear energy which
attracted relatively less media attention (Lemańczyk, 2013). The
coverage is overwhelmingly positive and the hegemonic repre-
sentation of fracking suggests that it will solve all of Poland’s
economic and political problems and actively bolster the future
and wellbeing of the country. To contextualize this study in
emerging theory and research which attempts to link environ-
ment/energy with human identity (Jaspal et al., 2014a,b), it is
plausible to hypothesize that the positive social representation of
fracking which is disseminated and encouraged in the Polish press
would have favourable outcomes for people’s sense of continuity,
self-esteem, self-efficacy and distinctiveness. These are important
principles of identity and are likely to contribute to how people
view fracking and how they subsequently respond to it socially
and psychologically (Jaspal and Breakwell, 2014). Consumers of
the Polish media will plausibly feel better about their Polish
national identity, more empowered as citizens of a country with
‘immense’ shale gas reserves, less dependent on ‘malevolent’
outgroups, and more able to continue to live their lives, despite
global fears about growing energy insecurity. It is, therefore, likely
that people will manifest little opposition to the emerging positive
representations of fracking in the Polish press.
While positive representations of fracking may well be bene-
ficial for identity processes, the technology must be debated in a
responsible and inclusive manner with both the benefits and the
risks openly and actively outlined and discussed by various
stakeholders. All of the potential scenarios – both positive and
negative – need to be debated. The scientific and technological
elements – both positive and negative – should be acknowledged.
The cost implications – favourable and unfavourable – should be
borne in mind. However, it appears that the Polish press has
polarized the debate on fracking in a particular (positive) direction
and, thus, may silence open and constructive discussion of the
technology and its implications for Polish society. The construction
of anti-fracking as un-Polish and, worse still, as a Russian agenda
may be an obstacle to voicing concern about fracking. This may
also impede the development of a responsible and politically
sound energy policy in Poland, as, ideally, policy should be
developed within a context of transparency and critical debate
involving multiple actors—scientists, politicians, companies, aca-
demics and, perhaps most importantly, communities. We hope
that this article will encourage further research and insight into
the social, geopolitical and psychological aspects of fracking as it
continues to be seriously envisaged in a growing number of
geographical contexts.
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